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Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 2003 (2011), by which the Council requested me to report every 90 days on progress made towards implementing the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It includes an update on the situation in Darfur since my last report dated 17 April 2012 (S/2012/231), an assessment of progress against benchmarks set out in annex II to my report to the Council of 16 November 2009 (S/2009/592) and, pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 2003 (2011), an assessment of the enabling environment for a Darfur-based political process.

II. Political developments

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

2. During the reporting period, the signatory parties to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), continued to work towards the implementation of its provisions. In accordance with the power-sharing arrangements, between 3 and 18 April, six LJM members were appointed state ministers, including one to the post of Deputy Wali of Eastern Darfur. Early in May, $25 million and seven vehicles were transferred by the central Government to the Darfur Regional Authority, the body established under the Doha Document to implement its provisions in conjunction with the Government of the Sudan. That enabled the Authority to establish offices in Khartoum and Darfur, commence the recruitment of staff and undertake planning activities.

3. On 22 May, the African Development Bank, the Darfur Regional Authority, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank and other international partners met in Khartoum to initiate planning for the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission provided for in the Doha Document. The purpose of that Mission is to identify and assess the needs for economic recovery, development and poverty eradication in Darfur. It is projected to be completed by the end of 2012 and form the basis for donor resource mobilization.

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4. Many provisions of the Doha Document remained unimplemented several months after the stipulated deadlines had passed. That included the transfer of funds by the central Government to the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to enable the implementation of reconstruction projects, the first tranche of which, $200 million, due upon signing the agreement on 14 July 2011, was deferred.

5. On 24 April, during a briefing to the National Assembly on the status of the Doha Document, the Chair of the Darfur Regional Authority, El Tigani Seisi stated that a shortage of funding for the Authority and associated bodies was seriously hindering implementation of the agreement. Mr. Seisi then met with representatives of the Government of Qatar in Doha to discuss implementation of the agreement and the Authority's plans. Following the meeting, $31 million was pledged by the Government of Qatar for early recovery and development in Darfur, in line with priorities identified during an assessment mission to the region undertaken by its representatives from 26 March to 1 April. Furthermore, following a series of meetings in June, a committee consisting of the signatory parties and UNAMID revised the Doha Document implementation timetable in order to extend the indicated deadlines for all benchmarks by one year.

6. On 2 May, the Government of the Sudan issued two decrees intended to expedite implementation of the Doha Document. By the first it established an oversight body, the High Follow-up Committee for Peace in Darfur, chaired by President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir. By the second decree it broadened the membership of the Darfur Peace Follow-up Office, the body established on 27 August 2011 to coordinate the activities of the Government carried out in line with the Doha Document, to include senior representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Information, the Interior and Justice and the National Intelligence and Security Services. The decree also expanded the mandate of the Office to include contact with non-signatory movements and the development of strategies to promote peace in Darfur. At its first meeting, on 16 May, the High Follow-up Committee considered an implementation progress report prepared jointly by the Darfur Regional Authority and Darfur Peace Follow-up Office. The Darfur Peace Follow-up Office met on 4 June, during which political, security, economic and information subcommittees were established to facilitate implementation within specific areas of Government.

7. The dissemination of the Doha Document by the signatory parties in conjunction with civil society organizations continued. UNAMID provided technical and logistical assistance to the parties in the convening of 55 workshops between 1 April and 29 June for 9,562 representatives of Darfuri stakeholder groups. That brought the total number of participants in dissemination workshops since October 2011 to approximately 24,400, 34 per cent of whom were women.

8. Consistent with earlier workshops (see S/2012/231, para. 9), participants, in particular representatives of internally displaced persons, community leaders and civil society organizations, urged the parties signatory to the agreement to do more to implement its provisions; called for the increased involvement of civil society in monitoring implementation; and encouraged the international community to urge the Government to meet its financial commitments under the agreement. Representatives of the nomads expressed concern that the agreement did not adequately address their needs, in particular as they pertain to land access and compensation. Some representatives of internally displaced persons, students,

nomads and returnees expressed disquiet over the lack of tangible benefits arising from the agreement and scepticism about the ability of the signatory parties to implement it without the support of the major non-signatory movements.

9. While most workshops took place without restrictions, participants complained at six events that the presence of National Intelligence and Security Services agents limited their discussions on human rights violations perpetrated by security agencies. Workshops planned in Abu Jabra, Abu Matariq, Adilla and Shaeria in Eastern Darfur on 11, 12 and 13 June were postponed after restrictions of movement were imposed on UNAMID personnel in connection with Government military operations. Workshops were subsequently held in Abu Jabra and Abu Matariq on 27 June. At the time of writing, UNAMID was in discussions with the Government and LJM to reschedule the workshops to be held in Adilla and Shaeria. Furthermore, dissemination workshops could not be held in the Hamadiya, Hassa Hissa and Khamsa Dagaig camps near Zalingei in Central Darfur owing to opposition from the camps' leaders, who support the non-signatory movement, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Abdul Wahid.

10. The Implementation Follow-up Commission held its third meeting in Doha on 28 May. The Commission considered reports presented by the signatory parties and UNAMID on progress made in the implementation of the Doha Document. While the Commission welcomed the progress made so far in the implementation of the Doha Document, it expressed concern about delays in establishing the institutions provided for in the agreement. Members noted the need to increase the inclusiveness of the peace process through the resumption of peace talks between the Government and non-signatory movements. Furthermore, they expressed concern about the negative implications for the security situation in Darfur of the hostilities between the Sudan and South Sudan and called, in this regard, for compliance with Security Council resolution 2046 (2012).

Negotiations towards an inclusive peace agreement

11. The Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Ibrahim Gambari, continued to promote the resumption of talks between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements. On 9 April, he met with representatives of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in London and, on 15 May, SLA-Minni Minawi and SLA-Mother in Kampala. The movements advised that they remain committed to the objectives of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, including the overthrow of the National Congress Party-led Government.

12. Several smaller armed movements and factions expressed to the Joint Mediation Support Team an interest in holding talks with the Government using the Doha Document as a basis for discussions. They included JEM-Revolutionary Command, LJM-Unity, Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity (Adam Abdulaziz faction) and elements of the Roadmap Group led by Ali Daoud. On 26 May, the Joint Mediation Support Team and UNAMID met in Jebel Kargo, Central Darfur, with field commanders of a JEM faction led by Mohammed Bahr to assess the faction's credibility as a potential negotiating party. Approximately 60 armed men aboard vehicles mounted with machine guns, whose commanders claimed to represent 1,600 fighters, attended the meeting. The commanders affirmed their loyalty to Mohammed Bahr and their readiness to enter into talks with the

Government. The assessment team was unable to independently verify the faction's military strength.

Internal Darfur dialogue on the peace process

13. The African Union and United Nations framework (see S/2012/166) was designed to promote lasting peace in Darfur through a process that includes all major stakeholders, including non-belligerents. The framework provides for the holding of Darfur-based internal consultations to complement and enhance the Doha Document. In addition, the Doha Document provides for Darfur internal dialogue and consultations to consolidate peace and encourage reconciliation. In resolution 2003 (2011), the Security Council requested an assessment of the conditions necessary for a credible Darfur-based political process to enable it to determine, taking into account the views of the African Union, the engagement of UNAMID in support of the process.

14. The number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID increased from 25 in the previous reporting period to 65 in the present period. Of those, 33 civilians were detained in Geraida, Southern Darfur, by Government authorities following an attack on the town by SLA-Minni Minawi forces on 8 May (see para. 22 below). The overall number of documented human rights violations, including violations of the right to physical integrity, through violence and physical harassment, and to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, remained relatively unchanged at 145 incidents involving 439 victims from 1 April to 30 June, compared with 148 incidents involving 374 victims from 1 January to 31 March. While there were no recorded direct violations of the rights to freedom of speech and assembly, as noted above, powers of arbitrary arrest without judicial oversight continued to be exercised by Government authorities, thereby adversely affecting the human rights situation as it pertains to civil and political freedoms.

15. In the context of disseminating information about the Doha Document, UNAMID sought the views of Darfuri stakeholders on the role of internal dialogue. As noted in paragraph 8, that involved consultations throughout Darfur and in Khartoum with representatives of, inter alia, civil society organizations, nomadic communities, internally displaced persons, the native administration, State legislators and traditional community leaders. The majority of stakeholders consulted recognized that the Darfur-based internal dialogue has the potential to strengthen popular support for the Doha Document, increase the inclusiveness of the peace process and promote reconciliation between communities. A broad cross section of stakeholders, in particular representatives of internally displaced persons, traditional community leaders and nomads, expressed concern about whether all major stakeholder groups would be allowed to participate; the process would be free from manipulation by the parties to the conflict; participants would be allowed to freely and safely express their views; and the parties would be willing to implement the outcomes. They called nevertheless for the process to start immediately, for civil society organizations to be assisted by the international community so that they can monitor events and for the international community to encourage the non-signatory movements to support the consultations.

16. The holding of Darfur internal dialogue and consultations provided for in the Doha Document is one of the highest priorities of the Darfur Regional Authority. It has developed plans to hold a preparatory conference for all stakeholders in

El Fasher, Northern Darfur, from 10 to 12 July, to solicit public support for the implementation of the agreement and to develop a plan for Darfur internal dialogue and consultations. In conjunction with Government authorities, the Authority intends to facilitate the selection of 800 participants from a broad range of Darfuri stakeholder groups. In response to a request from the Authority for UNAMID support with logistical arrangements and the selection of participants, and in the light of the relatively few restrictions encountered during the 134 workshops to disseminate the Doha Document, UNAMID agreed to provide some logistical support, in particular the transportation of participants.

Other developments

17. On 18 June, President Al-Bashir announced the introduction of a series of austerity measures that included reductions in Government subsidies on fuel and other commodities; downsizing of the federal and state governments; and reductions to the salaries, allowances and privileges of Government employees. In that context, the Walis of Eastern and Western Darfur, Mohamed Hamid Fadlalla Hamed and Haidar Mohamed Atim Glokoma, announced on 26 June that they had dissolved their states' governments in preparation for the re-establishment of smaller, reconfigured administrations.

18. In a communiqué issued on 1 June following its third leadership bureau meeting at an undisclosed location, the Sudan Revolutionary Front alliance, inter alia, reiterated its objective to overthrow the National Congress Party regime, called for opposition groups to unite and work with the alliance and welcomed the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2046 (2012). Several small Darfur armed movements and factions informed the Joint Mediation Support Team during the reporting period that they had joined the Sudan Revolutionary Front, including SLA-Democracy, SLA-Mother and SLA-Unity (Abdalla Yahya faction).

19. With regard to resolution 2046 (2012), in which I was requested to inform the Council in two-week intervals on the status of compliance by the Sudan, South Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North with the decisions set forth in the resolution, UNAMID monitored the parties' compliance in Darfur and provided information for fortnightly briefings provided to the Council (see also para. 23, below).

III. Security situation

20. Clashes between Government and movement forces occurred sporadically during the reporting period, particularly in Southern and Eastern Darfur. Multiple reports of military fighting, including, according to the Government of the Sudan, between Sudanese Armed Forces and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) near the border between Southern Darfur and Western Bahr El Ghazal, could not be verified owing to Government imposed restrictions.

21. UNAMID received reports of fighting between Sudanese Armed Forces and unidentified movement forces on 17 April in Samaha, 100 km east of El Daein, Eastern Darfur; Saysaban, 140 km south-west of Nyala, Southern Darfur; and Um Dafok, 265 km south-west of Nyala. There were also reports of such fighting on 19 April in Songo, 265 km south-west of Nyala. An SLA-Minni Minawi spokesperson claimed involvement in the clashes in Um Dafok. UNAMID

confirmed the fighting in Samaha, but was unable to independently verify the incidents in Southern Darfur because of restrictions imposed by local Government authorities. Humanitarian agencies provided assistance to 19,000 civilians newly displaced from Samaha to neighbouring villages by the fighting.

22. On 8 May, SLA-Minni Minawi forces took control of Geraida, 95 km south of Nyala, from Sudanese Armed Forces, until Government forces regained control of the town the following day. UNAMID verified that a total of 14 Government soldiers and police were killed and two injured; three civilians were killed and 13 injured; Government installations and shops were destroyed; and the market was looted of fuel and other supplies. In Northern Darfur, on 26 June, armed movement forces ambushed a Sudanese Armed Forces military convoy at Dobo Umda, 90 km south-west of El Fasher. UNAMID was unable to verify the reports of casualties claimed by the parties, which varied considerably. A UNAMID patrol verified the aerial bombing by the Sudanese Armed Forces near Hashaba village, 20 km west of Tawilla, on 27 June. No casualties or cases of displacement were recorded.

23. Government authorities informed UNAMID that, on 29 April, SPLA and Sudan Revolutionary Front elements had taken control of Kafindebei, 275 km south-west of Nyala, from Sudanese Armed Forces. A Sudanese Armed Forces spokesperson claimed that Government forces regained control of the town on 7 May. According to local sources, 7,000 civilians were displaced by the fighting. Furthermore, the Government of the Sudan alleged that SPLA elements conducted operations near the Southern Darfur-Western Bahr El Ghazal border in Al Miram and Um Dafok on 17 and 18 May and in Kafia Kingi, Siri Malga and further east in Samaha on 22 and 24 May. UNAMID has thus far been unable to verify the reports because of access restrictions.

24. With regard to incidents between local communities, on 19 April a case of minor theft and assault in Zaleda village, 90 km west of Nyala, triggered a clash between groups of Zaghawa and Taalba. Community representatives informed UNAMID that two people, one Taalba and one Zaghawa, were killed in the fighting and four people were injured. The conflict was resolved by the native administration through a traditional reconciliation process. On 4 May, a group of nomadic Rezeigat tribesmen attacked five Massalit farmers in Abu Jabra village, 67 km south of Nyala, killing two people and injuring three. Tension between the communities was eased through an intervention by their traditional community leaders.

25. On 16 and 17 April, unidentified armed men attacked South Sudanese living in Sharif camp, 125 km east of El Daein, and Khor Omer camp in El Daein, respectively. Three South Sudanese sustained injuries in the first incident and four in the second. UNAMID increased patrolling to the camps and Government police established a round-the-clock security presence at the 11 camps in Eastern Darfur that host South Sudanese communities. According to a Red Crescent Society assessment concluded in March 2012, 60,000 people of South Sudanese origin currently reside in Southern and Eastern Darfur.

26. With regard to the freedom of movement of UNAMID personnel, from 1 April to 30 June, the mission's movements by land were restricted on 27 occasions, compared with 31 in the previous reporting period. For its air operations, during the same period, Government authorities denied 357 of 5,037 flight requests, an increase from 116 of 4,460 in the previous reporting period. They included intermittent restrictions imposed by Government authorities on flights between

Khartoum and El Fasher from 3 to 12 May and between Khartoum, El Fasher and Nyala from 10 to 12 June while Sudanese Armed Forces air operations in Darfur were under way.

27. Furthermore, on 20 April, Government authorities, citing planned and/or ongoing military action, informed UNAMID and humanitarian organizations that access to the Tulus, Buram, Edd al Fursan, Kafia Kingi, Kafindebei and Um Dafok areas in Southern Darfur was restricted. Despite the authorities informing the Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat on 29 April that the restrictions had been lifted, UNAMID continued to be prevented from accessing the areas by authorities citing insecurity. During the reporting period, access was intermittently restricted to Shaeria and Labado (Southern Darfur) and Shangil Tobaya, Dar al Salam and Thabit (Northern Darfur). The majority of restrictions were imposed in areas where there was alleged to be ongoing or recently concluded military fighting and where authorities suspected the presence of active non-signatory armed movement forces.

28. Restrictions were also imposed on UNAMID civilian personnel. On 15 April, National Intelligence and Security Services agents in Kass, Southern Darfur, stopped a UNAMID civil affairs workshop for local interlocutors on conflict resolution, citing a lack of prior authorization. Also in Kass, on 15 May, a UNAMID human rights monitoring mission was restricted by local authorities, who cited a lack of prior written authorization.

29. UNAMID continued to call upon representatives of the Government of the Sudan at all levels to allow the mission full and unrestricted freedom of movement. During the 13th tripartite meeting of the United Nations, the African Union and the Government of the Sudan, held in El Fasher on 23 June, access restrictions were a key point of discussion. Government officials undertook at the meetings to reiterate to their field commanders that authorities may provide security advice to UNAMID, but are not to prevent its activities from proceeding.

30. Progress in the implementation of the Doha Document ceasefire and final security arrangements was limited during the reporting period. This was due to a disagreement between the signatory parties over the initial verification of LJM forces, conducted between 5 and 9 March. Government officials insisted that the exercise be repeated with narrower criteria for eligibility as a combatant. LJM, however, insisted on the maintenance of broader criteria and the verification of additional forces not included by the movement in the initial verification exercise. UNAMID is continuing to facilitate talks between the parties to promote resolution of the issue.

31. In accordance with the Doha Document, the Government submitted to UNAMID in May its plan for the disarmament and disbandment of armed militia groups in Darfur. It provides for the establishment of a Disarmament Committee, the registration of militias, the conduct of a public awareness campaign and a disarmament phase, to be conducted over a 220-day period. UNAMID is seeking additional clarification from the authorities regarding the identities, strengths and locations of the groups to be disarmed. According to the revised Doha Document implementation timetable, the deadline for submission of the plan is 21 August 2012.

Safety and security

32. The safety and security situation for United Nations and humanitarian personnel in Darfur remained of concern. Criminal acts targeting UNAMID personnel resulted in the death of one peacekeeper and injuries to three others when, on 20 April, a group of unidentified armed men attacked a UNAMID formed police unit near Mournei, 70 km south-east of El Geneina, Western Darfur. After an exchange of fire, the assailants fled the scene. Government police have yet to make arrests in connection with the incident.

33. On 13 May, the four national staff members of the International Committee for the Red Cross who had been abducted by unidentified assailants on 28 April in the Fata Borno area, 100 km north-west of El Fasher, were released in Kabkabiya, 135 km west of El Fasher. The World Food Programme (WFP) employee abducted in Nyala on 6 March was released on 30 May. Investigations by national authorities are ongoing.

34. A total of six vehicles of international non-governmental organizations, three belonging to UNAMID and two to other intergovernmental organizations were carjacked during the period under review, compared with a total of 18 carjackings from 1 January to 31 March. The total for the reporting period represents a marked increase from the five incidents recorded during the same period in 2011. Government police subsequently recovered the three UNAMID vehicles and one of the international non-governmental organization vehicles.

35. On 15 May, the two staff members of the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, who had been detained on 24 February by Government authorities and held in El Daein, were released. On 27 April and 23 May, two UNAMID staff members of South Sudanese origin were arrested and detained by Government police in Nyala and Abu Matariq respectively while returning from leave in South Sudan. In the first incident, the staff member was released later the same day after he presented United Nations identification. In the second, the staff member was released on 27 May following an intervention by UNAMID.

IV. Humanitarian situation

36. During the reporting period, the Return and Reintegration Working Group, led by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, confirmed that 37,444 internally displaced persons and 1,145 refugees voluntarily returned to various locations in Darfur between 1 January and 31 March 2012. Of those, 29,654 internally displaced persons and 1,145 refugees returned to locations in Western Darfur and 7,790 internally displaced persons to locations in Northern Darfur. A lack of education, health care, water and livelihood opportunities available to returnees continued to be of concern. Humanitarian agencies distributed non-food items, implemented livelihood projects and worked with local government authorities to provide basic social services.

37. Food insecurity was of increasing concern in parts of Darfur owing to a relatively poor harvest in 2011. A post-harvest assessment conducted by WFP in April identified a food deficit of approximately 140,000 tons of cereal in both Northern and Southern Darfur and a 25 per cent increase in the prices of agricultural produce and livestock in those states since the beginning of the year. In Central

Darfur, an assessment by the State Ministry of Agriculture concluded in December 2011 that available food resources were only sufficient to cover 64 per cent of the population's food requirements for the year. Interventions from WFP, including the increased distribution of food and pre-positioning of supplies before the onset of the rainy season; the release from its strategic reserves of 50 tons of cereals by the Central Darfur State government in May; and increased food production by the commercial sector are expected to cover the deficit.

38. Humanitarian aid workers continued to experience access restrictions and bureaucratic impediments during the reporting period. United Nations Humanitarian Air Services flights between El Fasher and deep field locations in Northern Darfur were suspended from 3 to 10 April by Sudanese military authorities, who cited insecurity. In mid-April, the Government, citing insecurity, introduced a requirement for humanitarian organizations to submit requests for permits to the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission 72 hours prior to travelling in Southern Darfur. On 16 and 17 May, local government authorities prevented United Nations agencies from entering the Zam Zam camp, citing a lack of written authorization. Furthermore, local government authorities restricted access for all aid agencies to the Radom locality on the Southern Darfur-Western Bahr Al Ghazal border throughout June.

39. On 22 April, National Intelligence and Security Services agents entered the offices of two national non-governmental organizations to enforce an order issued by the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission to suspend the agencies' operations. Authorities confiscated vehicles and equipment. One of the organizations was allowed to resume operations on 30 April, whereas the other's operations remain suspended. No reason was provided for the closures. The suspended organization was involved in distributing food for an international non-governmental organization to approximately 100,000 internally displaced persons in camps in Eastern Darfur.

40. Furthermore, health-care assistance decreased in Northern Darfur following the suspension by Médecins Sans Frontières of most of its medical activities in the Jebel Si area. That decision was attributed to difficulties obtaining travel and work permits for staff and to long-standing restrictions on the movement of medical supplies. Authorization to transport medical supplies to the area was last received in September 2011. The organization was the sole health-care provider in an area with a population of approximately 100,000, plus 10,000 seasonal nomads.

V. Rule of law, governance and human rights

41. Incidents of human rights violations recorded by UNAMID predominantly involved cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual and gender-based violence and violations of the right to physical integrity.

42. As noted in paragraph 14, above, the overall number of documented human rights violations in the reporting period remained relatively unchanged at 145 cases involving 439 victims, compared with 148 cases involving 374 victims in the previous reporting period. The situation continued to be characterized by an absence of accountability for human rights violations. Of the 145 cases involving violations documented by UNAMID, 20 were reported to Government police, six of which are under investigation.

43. UNAMID-documented violations of the right to physical integrity accounted for 49 incidents involving 315 victims, compared with 73 cases involving 232 victims in the previous reporting period. The majority of victims were physically assaulted by groups of unidentified assailants while undertaking livelihood activities, such as farming or proceeding to market.

44. The number of victims of arbitrary arrest and detention recorded by UNAMID was 65. In addition to the 33 civilians detained in mid-May following an attack on Geraida by SLA-Minni Minawi forces (see paras. 14 and 22, above), a former Sudan People's Liberation Movement official was arrested on 8 May and detained for nine days by Sudanese Armed Forces in Foro Baranga, Western Darfur. In all cases, local authorities did not provide reasons to the victims for the detention and denied the victims access to legal representation. UNAMID repeatedly urged Government authorities to refrain from arbitrarily arresting civilians and to release or charge those currently in detention.

45. The mission recorded 33 cases of sexual and gender-based violence during the reporting period, involving 37 victims, 23 of whom were minors. This represents a slight decrease from 31 cases involving 41 victims, including 12 minors, in the previous reporting period. Further to advocating for greater accountability for human rights violations, UNAMID monitored police investigations and court proceedings, including cases of sexual and gender-based violence. In a hearing in Buram on 10 April, two people accused of raping six internally displaced women in Geraida on 24 September 2011 were sentenced to five years of imprisonment and 100 lashes. UNAMID monitored the court proceeding to encourage authorities to hold a fair trial and advocated against corporal punishment.

46. On 10 June, the Prosecutor for the Special Court for Darfur, Ahmed Abdel-Motalib, resigned for undisclosed reasons. A new Prosecutor, Mohamed Bushara Dousa, was appointed on 21 June. This was the fifth such appointment since the position was established in 2003.

47. With regard to capacity-building of the State judiciary, UNAMID organized transitional justice workshops for civil society and local authorities, including workshops on 26 and 27 June in Tawilla, 60 km west of El Fasher, for 60 leaders of internally displaced persons, women and youth, and, in conjunction with the United Nations Children's Fund and the State Council for Child Welfare, on 27 June in Nyala for 40 Government police, prosecutors and social workers.

48. To improve the basic human rights situation for prisoners, UNAMID, in conjunction with the World Health Organization and the State Ministry of Health, organized a medical camp at Nyala Central Prison on 13 March, at which 374 prisoners, staff and children received treatment. In addition, the mission provided water and water storage equipment to Nyala Central Prison, Ardamata Prison in El Geneina and Zalingei Prison to avert severe water shortages.

Child protection

49. On 10 May, LJM submitted to UNAMID a signed action plan committing itself to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. According to the plan, LJM undertook to, inter alia, register with the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission all children associated with the Movement so as to allow their reintegration into communities by 31 December 2012. In furtherance of the

action plan, submitted to UNAMID on 14 June 2010, 257 children formerly associated with SLA-Free Will, a signatory party to the Declaration of Commitment to the Darfur Peace Agreement, were registered with the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission for reintegration in the areas of Malha, Sereif, El Fasher, Turra and Kafud, Northern Darfur.

VI. Protection of civilians

50. UNAMID continued to enhance its capacity to protect civilians. An additional 66 civilian staff members with expertise in civil affairs, human rights, humanitarian liaison and rule of law were redeployed from UNAMID mission and State headquarters to 26 team sites. This brings to 82 the total number of civilian staff deployed in that capacity to team sites throughout Darfur.

51. During the reporting period, threats to the protection of civilians of South Sudanese origin, in particular those residing in camps for displaced persons in Eastern Darfur, were a key concern of the Darfur Protection Sector, which comprises humanitarian agencies, UNAMID and the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission. A Red Crescent Society assessment of protection risks, conducted from December 2011 to March 2012, found that South Sudanese in Darfur are most concerned about their safety, ambiguous citizenship status, whether they will retain access to free social services and whether their children will be allowed to continue to attend school. The assessment contained a recommendation that an advocacy campaign be held to ensure South Sudanese are aware of the procedures instituted by the Government of Sudan on 8 April 2012, requiring the population of South Sudanese origin living in the Sudan to obtain travel and work documentation; it also recommended initiatives to promote peaceful coexistence between South Sudanese and other communities; and the revision of United Nations agencies' contingency plans for the provision of emergency assistance in the border area between Darfur and South Sudan. The Darfur protection sector is scheduled to consider the recommendations at its next meeting in July and use them as a basis for developing a joint protection plan for the 60,000 people of South Sudanese origin presently residing in Southern and Eastern Darfur.

52. The threat of harassment and physical violence directed at internally displaced persons in Zalingei was also of concern during the reporting period, particularly following an incident on 12 May in which a Hamadiya camp resident was killed. The victim, who allegedly was a former SLA-Abdul Wahid soldier who supported the Doha Document, was killed following an altercation with SLA-Abdul Wahid supporters. In response to the camp leaders' refusal to allow local security authorities into the camp to carry out an investigation, the State Wali, Yousif Tibin Musa Adam, threatened to order security forces to enter the camp by force. UNAMID met on 17, 18 and 22 May with the Wali and camp leaders to urge restraint and facilitate peaceful resolution of the situation. While the murder case is yet to be investigated, tensions between camp residents and Government authorities, and between communities within the camp, have eased.

VII. UNAMID deployment and operations

53. As at 30 June, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 86 per cent of the approved strength of 5,285 (1,107 international staff, 2,962 national staff and 472 United Nations Volunteers). The mission continued to mitigate security risks and enhance living conditions to improve the recruitment and retention of staff.

54. The strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 17,137, representing 87.6 per cent of the authorized strength of 19,555, including 16,562 troops, 294 staff officers, 209 military observers and 72 liaison officers.

55. The personnel strength of UNAMID police stood at 3,188, comprising 81 per cent men and 19 per cent women and representing 84.5 per cent of the authorized strength of 3,772. A total of 16 of the authorized 19 formed police units have been deployed (2,171 personnel, or 81.6 per cent of the authorized strength of 2,660). A seventeenth unit has been pledged.

56. During the reporting period, UNAMID conducted 12,783 patrols, including 5,727 routine patrols, 2,801 logistics and administrative patrols, 1,788 night patrols, 1,089 short-range patrols, 914 humanitarian escorts and 464 long-range patrols. UNAMID police conducted a total of 12,507 patrols, including 7,180 inside camps for internally displaced persons, 3,021 in towns and villages, 1,807 medium-range patrols, 277 humanitarian patrols and 222 long-range patrols.

57. Following a decision by the Government of the Sudan by which it required all South Sudanese in the Sudan after 8 April 2012 to obtain work and travel permits (see para. 51, above), Government authorities informed UNAMID that all of its staff members of South Sudanese origin would be required to leave the country by 30 June. After attempts to persuade the Government to allow the staff to continue working for UNAMID in Darfur proved unsuccessful, the mission transported the 104 staff members and their families to Juba by air on 22 and 29 June. Efforts are ongoing to secure employment in South Sudan for the staff.

58. From 1 April to 30 June 2012, the Government of the Sudan issued 842 new entry visas for UNAMID personnel. As at 30 June, 822 visas were pending, 403 of which were for civilian police officers, 149 for civilian personnel, 127 for military personnel, 123 for contractors and 20 for official visitors. On 1 April, the Government formally advised UNAMID by a note verbale of its decision to no longer issue entry visas to civilian police who are not proficient in Arabic. UNAMID continued to urge Government officials to urgently approve all visa requests irrespective of the applicants' language abilities in order to ensure the mission is suitably diverse, including with regard to women.

59. On 7 May, Government authorities informed UNAMID that the sole contracted supplier of food rations to the mission must cease operations and leave the country within 48 hours. Alleged discrepancies between the contractors' import notices and the quantity of rations dispersed was cited as the reason for the decision, but no substantiated evidence was presented. Subsequently, the authorities extended the deadline for the expulsion until 30 August. However, on 23 May, the Government grounded all of the contractor's flights and, on 29 May, Customs authorities in Port Sudan ceased clearing the contractor's shipments. As at 30 June, Customs clearances were pending for 29 containers of rations. The decision to expel the contractor has significant financial and operational implications. Establishing a

contract with a replacement provider would take an estimated six months and incur $70 million in "changeover costs". Senior officials of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNAMID undertook and continue to undertake démarches with Government authorities on the matter, including at the 13th tripartite meeting, held on 23 June.

60. Deficiencies in the operational and self-sustainment capabilities of military and police contingents remained of concern. Of the 54 units deployed to UNAMID, only 25 met the contingent-owned equipment requirements stipulated in the memorandums of understanding.

61. During the reporting period, UNAMID drilled an additional 11 water boreholes, bringing to 66 the total number of wells completed since its deployment. The wells are shared with local communities.

62. Following concerted action by the mission to conclude outstanding quick-impact projects, many of which were near completion but pending administrative action, a total of 134 projects were completed during the reporting period. An additional 108 projects are at various stages of completion. A total of 106 new project proposals were approved during the period under review.

63. UNAMID continued to reduce the threat posed by unexploded ordnance in Darfur. The mission surveyed and assessed as clear from unexploded ordnance 691 km of road, destroyed 21 items of unexploded ordnance and delivered unexploded ordnance awareness training to over 15,000 beneficiaries.

64. With a view to reducing violence within and between communities, UNAMID developed community-based labour-intensive projects that provide alternatives for youths susceptible to joining armed groups or gangs. The programme is modelled on the Community Violence Reduction programme implemented by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. A total of 18 projects related to education, health care, livelihoods, vocational training and the construction of community centres were identified and approved for implementation by local partners in various locations throughout Darfur.

65. The radio bridging solution for outreach to communities continued with one-hour long programmes broadcast twice daily on a short-wave frequency and by State FM radio stations in El Fasher and Nyala. UNAMID continued to urge the Government of the Sudan to issue a radio broadcasting licence, which would enable the mission to broadcast more frequently and via its own radio station.

66. The 13th tripartite meeting between the African Union, the Government of the Sudan and the United Nations was held in El Fasher on 23 June. Participants discussed, among other things, restrictions of movement, the deployment of Arabic-speaking UNAMID police, delays in the issuing of visas, the mission's outstanding request for a radio licence and the provision of support by UNAMID to voluntary returnees. Participants representing the Government of the Sudan undertook to meet with local authorities while in Darfur to reiterate to them that UNAMID is to be allowed unhindered freedom of movement throughout the region.

Implementation of the review of uniformed personnel

67. Regarding the implementation of the recommendations contained in the review of UNAMID uniformed personnel conducted by the mission, the Secretariat and the

African Union, a series of briefings to troop- and police-contributing countries were conducted. Most recently, on 11 June, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, briefed representatives of the Security Council and troop- and police-contributing countries in New York on the review recommendations and findings for UNAMID, the United Nations Mission in Liberia, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire. He subsequently met with the individual troop-contributing countries affected by the right-sizing of UNAMID. Implementation is to commence in July 2012 and will be conducted over a 12- to 18-month period according to planned rotations for military units, while adjustments to police contingents will be made through attrition by scheduled redeployment. Further to paragraph 82 of my report of 17 April 2012, and to consultations with the mission and troop-contributing countries, I have revised the downward adjustment of UNAMID military strength from 4,200 to 3,350 elements owing to the need to retain some additional engineers, well-drilling capacity and an enhanced force reserve element. The adjustment of the police component of 280 formed police unit elements and 1,460 individual police officers would remain as reflected in my report of 17 April.

VIII. Progress against operation benchmarks

68. Some progress was made against the first benchmark relating to the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict, thanks mainly to the progress, albeit modest, in the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace (see paras. 3 and 4, above). Feedback from participants in workshops held to disseminate information about the Doha Document indicated that the exercise has been effective in raising awareness about the agreement among Darfuri stakeholders. With regard to increasing the inclusiveness of the peace process, the prospect of negotiations commencing between the Government and major non-signatory movements, who continued to advocate for the overthrow of the central Government, appear unlikely in the near term.

69. The second benchmark relates to the restoration of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. Sporadic military clashes, in particular in Southern and Eastern Darfur, resulted in reports of civilian casualties and displacement. Many of the affected areas could not be accessed by the mission and humanitarian actors because of restrictions imposed by the authorities, who cited insecurity. Attacks on civilians of South Sudanese origin illustrated the degree to which minority groups in Darfur remain vulnerable to harassment and violence. Criminal attacks, kidnappings and carjackings involving UNAMID and humanitarian personnel demonstrated that the security threat to the staff members of those organizations remains high. While the security situation in Northern and Western Darfur was relatively stable, overall, military clashes in Southern and Eastern Darfur undermined progress against this benchmark.

70. The third benchmark pertains to strengthening the rule of law, governance and the protection of human rights. The overall human rights situation in Darfur remained of concern, in particular regarding arbitrary arrests, sexual and gender-based violence and violations of the right to physical integrity. UNAMID continued to provide technical and logistical support to local authorities and civil society to

build[4] their capacity to protect human rights and hold perpetrators of crimes accountable. However, indications of progress against this benchmark were limited.

71. The fourth benchmark relates to stabilizing the humanitarian situation and facilitating humanitarian access to populations in need of assistance. Overall, the humanitarian situation in Darfur remained relatively stable, except where clashes caused new displacement in, inter alia, Samaha and Kafindebei. The suspension of the operations of a national non-governmental organization and the decrease in the programmes of Médecins Sans Frontières reduced the amount of humanitarian assistance available in Eastern and Northern Darfur respectively. UNAMID sought to facilitate the work of humanitarian agencies by deploying additional civilians to team sites outside the main town centres. The projected food shortages and inflation in Northern, Central and Southern Darfur are a cause for concern. WFP, supported by UNAMID security escorts, pre-positioned food supplies prior to the rainy season to reduce the deficit in the short term.

IX. Financial aspects

72. The General Assembly, by its resolution 66/279, appropriated the amount of $1,448.6 million for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013, compared with the appropriation of $1,689.3 million for the period from 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012.

73. As at 29 June 2012, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNAMID amounted to $120.8 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $836.0 million.

74. Reimbursement to contributing Governments for troop and formed police costs and for contingent-owned equipment costs has been made for the periods up to 31 May 2012 and 31 March 2012, respectively, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

X. Observations and recommendations

75. There has been some progress made by the parties signatory to the Doha Document for Peace, the Government of the Sudan and LJM, towards implementation of the provisions of the Document, including in particular the initial transfer of resources by the central Government to the Darfur Regional Authority that enabled it to commence the initial work of establishing offices and engaging staff. I note, however, that progress has so far been focused mainly on establishing the institutions provided for in the agreement and associated political appointments. The realization of the agreement's promised peace dividend for the people of Darfur, including through reconstruction and support for the return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees, is less apparent and will require considerable and sustained investment.

76. A year has passed since the signing of the agreement, when the Government of the Sudan committed itself to providing the bulk of the funding for its implementation, and much has changed. The recent hostilities between the Sudan and South Sudan, and the Sudan's economic challenges, as outlined by President Al-Bashir in his address to the National Assembly on 18 June, appear to have

become the Government's primary focus. The non-signatory movements have been emboldened by this situation, and sporadic military action in Darfur involving these forces and those of the Government have increased, along with reports of more displacement and civilian casualties.

77. In the immediate term, it seems less certain that the necessary attention and support will be directed by the Government of the Sudan towards Darfur's much-needed recovery, rehabilitation and development, and the hopes of the people of Darfur for a lasting peace will remain aspirational. It is therefore more urgent than ever that the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan intensify their engagement and swiftly resolve their differences through dialogue. This is essential so that the Governments can focus their attention and resources on addressing the urgent and considerable needs of their respective populations, including in Darfur, and contribute to regional stability.

78. In the meantime, the Darfur Regional Authority is eager for the process of Darfur-based internal dialogue on an inclusive peace to commence. To this end, it intends to convene a preparatory conference for all stakeholders in El Fasher from 10 to 12 July. With regard to the Authority's request for support for the event, UNAMID will provide logistical assistance while closely monitoring and reporting on the environment within which the preparatory conference is held.

79. It remains important, particularly in the absence of an inclusive settlement of the conflict, that UNAMID continue to contribute to the protection of civilians, facilitate the delivery of aid to vulnerable populations and assist the signatory parties in their efforts to reach an inclusive settlement to the conflict. In the four years since the deployment of the mission, the security situation in Darfur has improved. Despite the many challenges that remain, UNAMID has made and is continuing to make contributions in this respect.

80. Accordingly, I recommend that the Council consider an extension by one year of the mandate of UNAMID. During that period, I would move forward with the implementation, in conjunction with the African Union, of the recommendations contained in the review of uniformed personnel. The reconfigured force, although smaller in number, would be better equipped and more rapidly deployable than at present to address emerging threats to civilians. Similarly, police personnel would possess skill sets appropriate to the prevailing and anticipated environment. In this connection, I would recommend that the Security Council consider decreasing the authorized strength of the military component of UNAMID from 19,555 to 16,200 and that of its police component from 3,772 individual police officers to 2,312 and from 19 formed police units to 17. At the same time, I would continue to provide support, in partnership with the African Union, to efforts to reach a comprehensive and inclusive settlement to the conflict through the implementation of the African Union and United Nations framework for the Darfur peace process.

81. Turning to the safety and security of UNAMID and humanitarian personnel, I condemn in the strongest terms those responsible for the attack on a UNAMID patrol that led to the tragic loss of the life of a formed police unit officer. Such acts are reprehensible and a violation of international law. Incidents involving the kidnapping and carjacking of UNAMID and humanitarian personnel remain of serious concern. I call on the Government to promptly arrest and bring to justice those responsible for these acts.

82. I am relieved and grateful for the release on 30 May of the World Food Programme employee detained on 6 March 2012. I call on the Government to hold accountable those who are responsible and to take steps to end the climate of impunity for such crimes in Darfur.

83. The numerous operational restrictions imposed on UNAMID by Government authorities during the reporting period, which included continued delays in the issuance of visas, restrictions on movement by land and air and the decision to expel the mission's sole contracted rations provider, are deeply concerning. Such restrictions limit the ability of UNAMID to effectively implement its mandated tasks, including the provision of assistance to the Government and LJM for the implementation of the Doha Document. I call on the Government to take all action necessary to allow the mission to operate freely throughout Darfur, in accordance with the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement.

84. In conclusion, I would like to note that the Joint Special Representative and Joint Chief Mediator ad interim, Ibrahim Gambari, will complete his assignment with UNAMID on 31 July 2012. I would like to take this opportunity to thank him for his service and his contributions to peacekeeping in Darfur. I would also like to express my appreciation to those Member States that have contributed military and police personnel to UNAMID, and to the African Union for its continued partnership in peacekeeping in Darfur. Lastly, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the women and men of UNAMID and the humanitarian community who work tirelessly in what are often arduous and challenging circumstances to assist the people of the region.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 17 July 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit a letter dated 17 July 2012 from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Nabil Elaraby, regarding the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex to the letter dated 17 July 2012 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I write with regard to an urgent and critical matter that is pivotal to the success of our joint efforts to address the Syrian crisis: the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS).

I am confident that you will agree with me that the term and nature of the mandate of UNSMIS are of critical importance, especially at the present juncture, when violence has reached such intolerable levels and the number of innocent victims who fall daily has become untenable. This matter is even more pressing now, in the aftermath of the latest tragedy that befell the village of Treimseh in Hama.

As you very rightly pointed out in your statement of 13 July, there is indeed an urgent need for collective and decisive action to immediately and fully stop the tragedy unfolding in Syria, and inaction becomes a licence for further massacres.

I also agree with you, in emphasizing that the Security Council must insist on the implementation of its decisions and on the need to send a strong message to all that there will be serious consequences for continued non-compliance. As you quite rightly stated, there must be united, sustained and effective pressure now.

The mandate of UNSMIS will come under consideration by the Security Council in a few days. I am confident that you appreciate the importance that the League of Arab States attaches to UNSMIS and its role in ending the violence and ensuring compliance with relevant Security Council resolutions.

No doubt, a strong, visible and active United Nations presence on the ground in Syria is essential for the successful implementation of what the international community has agreed upon.

The ministerial committee on Syria of the League of Arab States is scheduled to meet in Doha on 22 July to consider the current situation. It will examine the present stalemate and propose ways and means to ensure the cessation of violence and the implementation of the plan of the Joint Special Envoy, Kofi Annan.

I am sure that you would share my view that it is essential that the outcome of the ministerial meeting be before the Council as it addresses the mandate of UNSMIS and takes action on a matter that is at the heart of the Arab world and the Middle East.

Accordingly, I respectfully suggest that you consider advising the Council to postpone taking a decision on the mandate of UNSMIS for a few days, until after the conclusion of the meeting of the Arab ministerial committee. I have conveyed this request to you at my meeting in Addis Ababa with Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson.

In that regard, I will of course report to you and, through you, to the Council, in detail, the results of the meeting.

Furthermore, given that agreement among the Permanent Members of the Security Council has yet to be achieved regarding a Security Council resolution on the matter, perhaps such a postponement and the results of the meeting of the Arab ministerial committee may be conducive to consensus in the Council.

I sincerely hope that you and the members of the Security Council will be in a position to accommodate the preceding suggestion, which I believe is to the benefit of our collective action to bring about a peaceful, political resolution to a most dangerous situation.